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2Abstract23
Recent changes in the assessment and management of risks has had the effect that24
greater importance has been placed on relationships between individuals and within25
groups to inform decision making. In this paper, we provide the theoretical26
underpinning for an expected utility approach to decision-making. The approach,27
which is presented using established evidence support logic (TESLA™), integrating28
the expected utilities in the forming of group decisions. The rationale and basis are29
described and illustrated through a hypothetical decision context of options for the30
disposal of animal carcasses that accumulate during disease outbreaks. The approach31
forms the basis for exploring the richness of risk-based decisions, and representing32
individual beliefs about the sufficiency of evidence they may advance in support of33
hypotheses.34
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1. Introduction39
Regulatory decision-making is undergoing a revolution in the UK. Proposals40
for modernising regulation within Government in the 1990s (Cabinet Office, 1999)41
are being delivered through programmes that focus on ‘better’ and ‘risk-based’42
regulation (Pollard et al., 2002; Hutter, 2005). The premise is that a step change can43
be delivered, with the regulation of risks to occupational and public safety, to the44
safety of the food chain and to the environment becoming smarter, more focused on45
high risks, and decisions being more open to external scrutiny and challenge (Davies46
et al., 2010). In addition, we observe a renewed emphasis on the use of scientific47
3evidence in government decision-making. These initiatives test our understanding of48
the technical, political and psychological features of decision-making on risk,49
particularly in the regulatory and policy development contexts.50
Previously, UK Government departments and their agencies have published risk51
frameworks that set out the technocratic processes of risk management and options52
appraisal (see Strategy Unit 2002). These spell out how sufficient, dependent and53
necessary a number of sources of evidence are for providing a solid basis for decision54
making. However, such decisions involve the consideration of factors well beyond the55
nature of adverse consequences, their probabilities, and the uncertainties in these56
conventional dimensions. Risk managers need to consider the costs of risk57
management, associated social issues, performance of technology (where it plays a58
part), and governance arrangements critical to ensuring that risks are actively59
managed by organisations (Pollard et al., 2002). These attributes are reflected in the60
risk management ‘frameworks’ promoted by governments, regulators, business61
sectors and individual organisations. Yet in practice decisions are made by individuals62
within organisational contexts. For risk-based regulation, these are complex decisions63
requiring:64
(i) clear problem definition (scoping) that identifies the risk under study within the65
context of the legal statute;66
(ii) the gathering of evidence by multiple parties (professional advisors, researchers,67
the general public, operators, front line regulatory staff, regulatory policy staff);68
(iii) the structuring of arguments in support of a case, including the assembly of69
individual lines of evidence with their discrete strengths, and the overall weight of70
evidence;71
4(iv) the ‘brokering’ of evidence and risk assessments between parties, including72
between consultants and their clients, internally within organisations, between the73
regulated and the regulator, and between regulators and policy officials with74
individuals valuing the benefit and cost in addition to the reputation, trustworthiness75
and persuasiveness of the provider (Chiu et al., 2009); and76
(v) peer review of risk assessments and the supporting evidence in conjunction with77
defensible, robust decisions to be made on risk management, together with the78
defence of these decisions in the courts, if necessary (Defra, 2011).79
In practice, the conventional manner of establishing a risk-management80
framework is likely to take too long to gather sufficient information to inform81
decisions for the growing number of new imminent risks. As such, expert-elicitation82
panels have become a common route to produce an evidence-based framework. This83
approach can achieve results with relative speed and has become invaluable for84
practitioners of modern risk-based regulation. Expert-elicitation and the interpretation85
of information are subject to value judgements (regarding the sufficiency of86
supporting evidence), which are rarely transparent to the end user. As such, there87
remains a view that these frameworks fail to fully capture the nuances and88
complexities of decision-making (Oxera, 2000; Petts et al., 2003). For example, the89
influence that individual preferences (or expected utilities) will have on judgments90
made regarding the sufficiency, dependency and necessity of supporting evidence.91
This influence is difficult to identify and indeed to measure, however the impact of92
such influences are unclear and a model can help to determine how important these93
influences are in decision making. Previously, Chiu and colleagues (2009) have94
presented a formal quantitative model for recommendations within a95
customer/supplier relationship, demonstrating the impact of trust and reputation;96
5however, this model does not specifically consider the belief and uncertainty that an97
individual may have in recommendations.98
TESLATM (Quintessa, UK), a commercial platform for evidence support logic,99
is a decision-support tool that addresses issues of transparency within expert100
elicitation panel decisions, thereby providing unique insights that are not normally101
included in conventional decision-support tools. TESLATM can be used to describe102
and simulate complex systems. Environmental decision contexts, complex by their103
very nature, have been previously tackled by authors who have used evidence-support104
logic to negotiate, optimise the effectiveness of, and recently, model decisions.105
In this paper, we propose the theoretical basis for a model that integrates: (a) the106
structuring of evidence that supports a group decision (represented here by the107
adoption of evidence-support logic); (b) the benefits of a decision outcome108
(represented by expected utility theory); and (c) that demonstrates the relevance of109
other influences in group decision making to practitioners, providing a model that110
increases the transparency of decision making influences. Representation of the111
combined approach is made here using TESLA™.112
113
2. Methods114
2.1 Selection of a model platform115
TESLA™ offers the user a means of improving the transparency of regulatory116
decisions, by recording the structure and sufficiency of the evidence that supports a117
risk decision. It has been successfully used in the context of safety cases for nuclear118
waste management (Seo et al., 2004; Egan & Bowden, 2004) and is also proposed for119
building stakeholder confidence in the long term geological storage of carbon dioxide120
(Benbow et al., 2006; Egan, undated). Lines of evidence are represented by a121
6structured cascade of logical ‘parent’ and ‘child’ hypotheses, each with its own122
supporting evidence. User inputs are combined to determine how ‘sufficient’,123
‘dependent’ and ‘necessary’ each child hypotheses is for supporting its corresponding124
parent. TESLA™ does not account for the influence that personal preferences have on125
value judgements.126
127
2.2 Integrating expected utility theory in evidence-support logic128
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) can be incorporated within evidence-support logic129
to explore the integrity of TELSA™. This provides an indication of how subjective130
value-judgements bias the sufficiency of supporting evidence and the structure of the131
resulting framework.132
The evidence-support logic, embodied within TESLA™, is an information133
propagation approach developed from Interval Probability Theory (IPT) (Feller, 1971;134
Cui & Blockley, 1990; Hall et al., 1998a). It has been applied in several fields of risk-135
based decision-making to allow experts to characterise lines of evidence by136
expressing what they believe with regard to child hypotheses actively supporting,137
overlapping, or conflicting when considering a corresponding parent hypothesis (for138
examples, see Foley et al., 1997; Hall et al., 1998b).139
Expert belief is expressed by a triple (p, u, q), where p denotes the probability that140
an individual child hypothesis supports a corresponding parent hypothesis, q denotes141
the probability that it refutes the hypothesis, and u denotes the residual uncertainty142
attached to this belief. These values range between 1,0  qp and 11  u ; where143
1u would denote a state of absolute ignorance, and 0u would denote a state of144
conflicting beliefs within the evidence.145
7Evidence-support logic has a simple algorithm to aggregate multiple beliefs about146
evidence. For example, if n beliefs about n child hypotheses are aggregated to form a147
belief about a single parent hypothesis, each belief for each child hypothesis will be148
expressed as ),,( iii qup , ni ,,1 . Each child hypothesis would then have pi and qi149
values from 0 to 1 and ui value of -1 to 1 assigned to denote how much belief ‘for’ (pi)150
and ‘against’ (qi) and how much uncertainty (ui ) is related to the corresponding151
parent hypothesis’ belief. Greater values of sufficiency will result in evidence being152
more influential, whilst greater values of dependency result in pertinent child153
hypotheses having a shared influence. The presence of a necessary child hypothesis154
determines whether beliefs assigned to child hypotheses can be aggregated to form a155
belief for the corresponding parent hypothesis.156
If ( AAA qup ,, ) denotes the aggregated belief for child hypothesis A. Then pA can157
be computed as follows:158
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thi line of evidence and D is the dependency163
between the evidence nji ppp ,,,  . Then Aq can be computed similar to (1).164
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Once we have the values of Ap and Aq , Au can be determined by means of169
pA + qA + uA = 1 For example, when 2n and beliefs 1 and 2 are independent, we170
have,171





),min(),max(
),min(),max(
221122112211
221122112211
qwqwqwqwqwqwq
pwpwpwpwpwpwp
A
A (3)172
173
2.3. Incorporating expected utility174
Expected utility theory is widely adopted for addressing risk and uncertainty in175
economics (Hey & Orme, 1994; Starmer, 2000) and has applications in regulatory176
decision-making (Li et al. 2009). It can be traced back to the work of Daniel Bernoulli177
(1738) and has been further promoted through the ‘theory of games and economic178
behaviour’ (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). The underlying principle is that the179
decision-maker has prior knowledge of the probabilities of all activities occurring and180
can assign a value representing a sum of money or similar against each alternative.181
This assumes that the decision-maker has a complete, reflexive, transitive, and182
continuous evaluation over monetary outcomes, or in other words, s/he possesses a183
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.184
Expected utility over a set of outcomes can be expressed as,185
)()()(
1 i
n
i i
xpxuXU   (4)186
Where X is the utility of all the set of possible outcomes; x is the utility of an187
outcome; p is the probability of X as ))(,),(),(( 21 nxpxpxpp  ; )( ixp is the188
9probabilities of outcome Xxi  ( ni ,,1 ) occurring with finite elements Xx189
for which )(xp 0 , and that )( ixp 0 for all ni ,,1 and 1)(1  
n
i i
xp (all190
probabilities must add up to 1).191
Expected utility theory may also be applied for considering costs and benefits in192
risk-based regulation, where the public (or environmental) health is a benefit arising193
from preventative risk management decisions. If we consider a scenario of decision194
making under risk (for example, the disposal of nuclear waste; Pape, 1997) where195
there is a risk of an environmental hazard being realised, the hazard may lead to a loss196
of utility (e.g. wealth, ecosystem function, environmental quality), Nw Aw197
(expressed for illustrative purposes by a monetary value); where Nw denotes the198
value of the hazard not being realised and Aw the reduced value of the hazard being199
realised. In the case where the utility is purely financial, the decision maker can200
quantify the cost (loss of utility) of a hazard being realised ( Nw Aw ) and envisage201
the value of making an investment to manage the risk. The challenge that practitioners202
face, however, is the ability to optimise the amount of money (C) that they invest203
along with the extent to which they are able to minimise the risk of the hazard being204
realised (often referred to in regulatory circles as ‘optimisation’). For this, let 205
denote the possibility of a hazard being realised. We assume the existence of a state-206
independent utility function of the regulator )(wu defined over payoffs, thus:207
),( CU  )( Cwu A  )()1( Cwu N   (5)208
Notice that ),( CU  represents the expected utility of the regulator and that  is a209
function of C. For illustrative purposes, we assume that when the decision maker is210
risk-neutral, the condition of optimal expenditure against risk is:211
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)(1 AN ww  (6)212
Under (6), a risk is reduced to the extent that further investment would be213
disproportionate to the benefits received. Note that the optimal expenditure is214
independent of individual utility in (6). If the parameters of Nw , Aw and )(C are215
from unique sources and remain the same among all stakeholders, (6) then holds for216
different risk-neutral decision makers. Arrow and Lind (1970) indicated that decision217
makers should behave in a risk-neutral fashion when public welfare is concerned. For218
this, it is possible for the decision to be unanimous within a group of stakeholders.219
However, if the stakeholders are not all risk-neutral or cost and benefit are not evenly220
shared, (6) will not hold.221
By incorporating expected-utility theory within evidence-support logic we provide222
a greater level of transparency that facilitates optimisation being achieved. The output223
from TESLATM provides a decision maker with an informed, evidence-based,224
decision that they can use to decide the level of resource to invest in managing the225
risk. However, before this can happen, experts (or a group of experts) must come226
together to map out the cascades of parent and child hypotheses that form different227
lines of supporting evidence. Then experts must determine how sufficient, dependent228
and necessary each child hypothesis is for answering its corresponding parent.229
Sufficiency, in this context, becomes the expert’s best guess and is, of course, a value-230
based judgement. However, in group decisions, risk and benefit may be unevenly231
shared and the decision makers may have their own utilities towards risk and232
uncertainty.233
234
2.4 Application to group decision-making235
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When multiple agents are involved in group decision making, there is also a need236
to determine the group decision based on individual utilities and evidence-support237
logic. If there are m agents faced with n alternatives },,,{ 21 nxxx  each agent will238
have a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility and a monetary cost-benefit estimation for239
all alternatives. Here, the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is not necessarily the240
evaluation of his/her own individual benefit; rather the value of the decision expressed241
in terms of public health or environmental benefit (though monetised here for242
illustrative purposes). If )( ji xU denotes agent i ’s expected utility of an alternative jx243
where },,1{ mi  and },,1{ nj  , for each agent we are able to establish a set of244
beliefs, each of which denotes the comparison between two different alternatives.245
Therefore agent i ’s belief can be represented by the triple ( ijk
i
jk
i
jk qup ,, ) which246
denotes the belief where nkj ,1,  and kj  . For all n alternatives, every agent247
has a complete set of beliefs that contains )1(
2
1
nn items, each of which denotes a248
comparison between two different alternatives. For example, when n = 2, there is only249
one belief with respect to the hypothesis that ‘alternative jx is preferred to alternative250
kx ’. When n = 3, each agent has three beliefs. Each agent assigns a set of values251
(between 0 and 1) to each belief, which denotes how much sufficiency the agent252
assigns each belief. The relationship between individual beliefs and their utilities of253
alternatives can be expressed as:254
i
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Equations 7 to 9 are conditional functions; the value of the belief, pj and qk are267
dependent on where the utility functions,
i
kiji
D
xUxU )()(  , lie, in relation to the268
uncertainty, uj
i
kiji
D
xUxU )()(  .269
Each agent can be assigned a weight ( iw ) range from 0 to 1 that denotes her/his270
power in the group decision. This acts as the sufficiency of belief in the process of271
aggregation of multiple beliefs. Multiple agents’ beliefs can then be aggregated. The272
aggregated beliefs denote a group preference over all alternatives. This can be273
illustrated using a hypothetical example, in this case the decision over disposal274
13
options of animal carcasses produced during exotic disease outbreaks, which we have275
previously described the international policy context and implications of these types276
of decision and the benefits of having an established hierarchy of options for carcass277
disposal (Delgado et al., 2010).278
279
3. Results and discussion280
With exotic animal disease, the policy officials (in any country) must consider the281
differential merits of various carcass disposal options and the ensuing implications for282
public health, animal health and welfare and environmental protection. Consider a283
grossly simplified and hypothetical case whereby policy advice is informed by a284
stakeholder group on whether to restrict (or not) certain disposal methods. We assume285
that five agent representatives are involved: (1) a policy official; (2) a government286
regulator; (3) an environmental expert; (4) an industrial representative; and (5) a287
public interest representative. For ease of illustration, 3 alternatives (A1, A2, A3) are288
considered: A1, the on-farm burial of carcasses; A2, burial in permitted, constructed289
landfills; and A3, controlled incineration. A1 poses hazards to animal and human290
health and a high potential for groundwater contamination from pathogens and291
nutrients. A2 reduces this risk but retains a long term risk to groundwater and poses a292
significant odour nuisance, especially during the operational phase. A3 reduces293
animal health, public health and environmental risks to the minimum, but has the294
disadvantages of higher construction and maintenance costs. The benefit each agent295
perceives from each of the options in this illustrative example can be represented by296
either expected utilities (not shown here) or monetised values (Table 1).297
Table 1 Benefits of the agents298
14
There are three hypothesises: 1H : Alternative 1A is preferred to 2A ; 2H :299
Alternative 1A is preferred to 3A ; 3H : Alternative 2A is preferred to 3A . With300
respect to these hypothesises, each agent i has three beliefs ( iii qup 121212 ,, ),301
( iii qup 131313 ,, ) and ( ,23
ip ,23
iu iq23 ). According to (7), the values of the beliefs can be302
calculated for each hypothesis (Tables 2 to 4).303
Table 2 Individual beliefs on 1H304
Table 3 Individual beliefs on 2H305
Table 4 Individual beliefs on 3H306
By assigning each agent a weight of 0.2, the aggregated belief, can be computed307
by means of (1) and (2). TESLA™ provides a graphical interface on which to present308
these outcomes (Egan, undated; http://www.quintessa-309
online.com/TESLA/ESLGuide.pdf ).310
Figure 1 Interface of TESLA™.311
The aggregated beliefs are computed as: ( AAA qup 121212 ,, ) = (0.16, 0.22, 0.62);312
( AAA qup 232323 ,, ) = (0.39, 0.2, 0.41); and (
AAA qup 131313 ,, ) = (0.18, 0.14, 0.68). These313
beliefs infer that alternatives A2 and A3 are preferred to alternative A1, and314
alternative A3 is slightly preferred to alternative A2. Ratio plots, in which both315
individual beliefs and the aggregated beliefs are illustrated, can be produced for each316
hypothesis (Figures 2 to 4), where the horizontal axis indicates the percentage317
uncertainty in the evidence, and the vertical axis indicates the ratio of “evidence for”318
to the “evidence against”. In Figure 2, all beliefs lie below the horizontal axis, which319
shows a consensus that ‘A2 is better than A1’.320
Figure 2 Ratio plot with respect to 1H .321
15
Figure 3 Ratio plot with respect to 2H .322
Figure 4 Ratio plot with respect to 3H .323
In these examples, an equal weight was given to all agents to reflect their power to324
decide. Note that the scale of individual payoff or monetary values does not affect the325
group decision. Individual agents cannot manipulate the final decision by scaling up326
(or down) their benefits. This ensures that each agent cannot influence the group327
decision by more than his/her assigned weight, which provides a greater level of328
transparency to the model.329
This work establishes the basis for integrating evidence support logic and utility330
for regulatory decisions on risk. It allows, albeit mechanistically and in practice331
probably for presentational and illustrative purposes alone, an exploration of the role332
experts value judgements might have on regulatory decision outcomes. Nevertheless,333
as Monticino and colleagues (2007) also illustrate for forest ecosystem decisions334
affected by various stakeholder interests, ‘unpacking’ the flow of information between335
the contributors to decisions has merit in communicating the evidential basis for336
complex environmental decisions. A further contribution of this work, which we seek337
to further explore in later work, will be in understanding the role of personality traits338
on decision outcomes as well as the affect that different amounts of power will have339
on a group decision.340
341
4. Conclusions342
We have attempted to develop the theoretical basis for a model that seeks to343
represent expert judgements and the impact this has on the impact of supporting344
evidence within regulatory decisions. What emerges is a rudimentary proof of345
concept, which we have illustrated, which has application to authentic regulatory346
16
decision contexts. We have proposed a new decision support approach that can be347
used to make group decisions when risk, uncertainty, and conflicts of interest among348
stakeholders are involved. While this study makes a preliminary effort to link349
evidence-support logic and economic analysis, it should be recognised that it has been350
conducted using important simplifying assumptions; for example, individual utilities351
with respect to decision outcomes and the independency of individual beliefs. So far352
we deal with group decision making as a static process. However, it is of course a353
dynamic process where individual beliefs may change along with interactions354
between experts, and where uncertainty may be reduced through dialogue, negotiation355
and the introduction of new information. Intelligent computer agents can learn in this356
process and be adaptive to the dynamics. The benefit of this approach will be the357
ability it will provide Government bodies and organisations to explore the influence358
people in relative positions of power have on the weight assigned to different lines of359
evidence. Future research will focus on the dynamics of this group decision making360
process.361
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Table headings463
Table 1. Table showing the perceived benefits for Agents 1 to 5 (monetarised) for464
three alternative scenarios for carcass disposal, where A1 is the on-farm burial of465
carcasses; A2 is the burial in permitted, constructed landfills; and A3 is controlled466
incineration.467
Table 2. Table showing the individual beliefs on H1 (Alternative A1 is preferred to A2)468
Table 3. Table showing the individual beliefs on H2 (Alternative A1 is preferred to A3)469
Table 4. Table showing the individual beliefs on H3 (Alternative A2 is preferred to A3)470
471
472
Figure legends473
Figure 1. Graphic interface of TESLA demonstrating the aggregation of individual474
agent’s belief in a hypothesis (illustrated here with respect to H1) using a calcuated475
weight.476
Figure 2. Ratio plot of evidence ratio against the percentage uncertainty in the477
evidence illustrating aggregated (1) and individual beliefs (2-6) with respect to H1 .478
Figure 3. Ratio plot of evidence ratio against the percentage uncertainty in the479
evidence illustrating aggregated (1) and individual beliefs (2-6) with respect to H2.480
Figure 4. Ratio plot of evidence ratio against the percentage uncertainty in the481
evidence illustrating aggregated (1) and individual beliefs (2-6) with respect to H3.482
483
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